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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1954 TERM
The dissent in the instant case, replyiig both on prior decisions34 and the
"clean hands" doctrine, bitterly attacked the value of the testimony of a twelve
year old in a matter of this sort. Although this position is better founded in strict
legal principles, the majority has probably made a more practical compromise with
reality. To uphold the agreement would then have forced the court to admit its
unenforcability. However harsh the decision may have been on these parties,
in fact no more could have been granted the husband by any decision. The legal
denouncing of these agreements as unenforcable would have the effect of
wreaking havoc upon a fundamental principle behind innumerable mixed marriages,3 5 without any legal benefit.
INSURANCE
Contract to Assign Policy
In New York every contract to assign or assignment of a life insurance
policy, or promise to name a beneficiary of any such policy, is void unless in
writing and subscribed by the party to be charged.' In Katzman v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co.,2 plaintiff, wife of deceased insured, alleged that she and her husband orally
agreed that he should take out a policy on his life, naming her as beneficiary. This
he did, and then delivered the policy to her. She alleged also that deceased
surreptitiously took the policy from plaintiff's possession and made his sister
beneficiary. Plaintiff claimed that she was entitled to the life insurance proceeds
as the beneficiary under a constructive trust which she desired to be placed upon
the proceeds. The Court, reversing the order of the Appellate Division,3 held, that
the action was not barred by the Statute of Frauds; 4 a constructive trust could be
imposed if plaintiff proved the facts alleged.
Plaintiff in this case paid at least a substantial part of the premiums each
year, paid the burial expenses and had in large part supported her husband for
several years during his illness. The majority believed that, assuming the facts
34. The cases relied upon by the dissent, Bunim v. Bunim, 298 N. Y. 391, 83

N. E. 2d 848 (1949), and Weinberger v. Van Hessen, 260 N. Y. 294, 183 N. E. 429
(1932), are actually somewhat distant from the issues, and themselves rely on
rather unstable authority. However, they do constitute at least some precedent,
whereas there is no direct precedent available in this state for the majority
ruling.
35. Although dispensation for mixed marriages by Catholics is left to the
individual Bishops, Codex Juris Canonici (1918) Canons 1040, almost all dioceses
require such antenuptial agreements.
1. N. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW §31, subd. 9 (Statute of Frauds).
2. 309 N. Y. 197, 128 N. E. 2d 307 (1955).
3. 285 App. Div. 446, 137 N. Y. S. 2d 583 (1st Dep't 1955), in which court
granted summary judgment to defendant, and dismissed the complaint.

4, Note 1, supra,
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alleged by plaintiff to be proven, there was a valid assignment of the policy to
plaintiff by means of delivery; consequently, deceased insured had lost the right
to change the beneficiary, and therefore a constructive trust should be imposed on
the proceeds. The legislature in amending section 31 of the Personal Property
Law,6 did not intend to abrogate the well established doctrine applicable to express
The dissenting opinion claimed that the statute" was passed to avoid any such
7
parol trusts.
assignments as this, and that the constructive trust doctrine could not be used to
overcome the statute. In the cases cited by the dissent the circumstances did not
warrant consideration of a constructive trust.9 It does not seem so patent that the
legislative intended to do away with the constructive trust doctrine by the amendment of section 31 where the facts alleged indicate some confidential relationship
together with other equitable considerations, and are sufficiently proven. The
abolition of such an old, commonly used common law doctrine would seemingly
have been more explicit.
AppraisalProvisions Not Enforceable
Insured applied for an order pursuant to section 1450 of the New York
Civil Practice Act10 to compel insurers to comply with a provision for appraisal
contained in a fire insurance policy. The trial court granted the order to proceed
to appraisal; this was reversed by the Appellate Division."1 The Court of Appeals
5. The policy reserved to insured the right to change the beneficiary provisions at any time. In Bernstein v. PrudentialIns. Co. of America, 204 Misc. 775,
124 N. Y. S. 2d 624 (1953), the Court held that insured, after naming a beneficiary
and delivering a policy to her, had lost the right to change the beneficiary. The
first named had by the delivery become the owner; her consent was necessary.
the same result was reached in John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Sandrisser, 95
N. Y. S. 2d 399 (1950).
6. Amended in 1943 to add subd. 9, pertaining to the assignment of policies
and the agreement to name a beneficiary.
7. In Blanco v. Velez, 295 N. Y. 224, 66 N. E. 2d 171 (1946), the court held
that it was not within the purview of §31, subd. 9. Here a constructive trust was
imposed on proceeds of a policy in which one of several sisters was named as
beneficiary. The sisters had orally agreed to pay the premiums and to share the
proceeds, even though only one sister was named as beneficiary. See also,
Foreman v. Foreman, 251 N. Y. 237, 167 N. E. 428 (1929).
8. Note 1, supra.
9. In Goldberg v. Colonial Life Ins. Co. of Am., 284 App. Div. 678,
134 N. Y. S. 2d 865 (2d Dep't. 1954), the agreement was between agent and
insured. There was no confidential relationship on which to impose a constructive
trust. In In re Keeler's Estate, 186 Misc. 20, 53 N. Y. Supp. 61 (1954), the oral
agreement was ante-nuptial and was never executed. In Fischer v. N. Y. Savings
Baai, 281 App. Div. 747, 118 N. Y. S. 2d 742 (1st Dep't. 1953), deceased orally
agreed to name a creditor as beneficiary. Held: there being no delivery and no
confidential relationship, the actually named beneficiary takes the proceeds.
10. This section provides for court enforcement of arbitration agreements.
11. In re Delmar Box Co., 285 App. Div. 398, 137 N. Y. S. 2d 491 (3rd Dep't
1955).

